By Satyabrat Borah
The United States has long enjoyed a unique geopolitical position, buffered by vast oceans and abundant resources that allowed it to thrive with minimal external entanglement. As the 19th-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck famously observed, God seemed to have a special providence for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America. This natural advantage meant that global power projection was often a choice rather than a necessity for Washington. The new National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration in late 2025 revives this insular impulse, prominently declaring a pivot toward the Western Hemisphere through the assertion of a “Trump Corollary” to the historic Monroe Doctrine. This corollary aims to restore American preeminence in the Americas, denying non-hemispheric powers influence over key assets while addressing threats like migration and drug trafficking. It signals a broader recalibration of US grand strategy, one that prioritizes domestic renewal and selective engagement over the expansive primacy of recent decades.
This shift emerges amid profound domestic and international transformations. Internally, the United States grapples with polarized debates over its global role, with establishment voices advocating sustained hegemony clashing against calls for restraint. The Trump administration’s document explicitly challenges the post-Cold War consensus of liberal internationalism, criticizing past elites for overextending American resources in pursuit of a unipolar order. Internationally, the erosion of Western dominance is unmistakable, as rising powers and the Global South increasingly withhold consent to US leadership. The strategy reflects this reality by emphasizing “flexible realism” and “America First” principles, accepting that the era of the United States single-handedly upholding a global order is over. It declares that propping up the world like Atlas is no longer feasible or desirable, implicitly acknowledging the advent of multipolarity without fully embracing a new architectural framework.
The NSS elevates the Western Hemisphere as the primary theater of American security, viewing it as the frontline for protecting the homeland. The Trump Corollary builds on the original 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which warned European powers against interference in the Americas, but adapts it to contemporary challenges. It commits the US to countering hostile foreign incursions, particularly from actors like China seeking economic leverage or strategic footholds. This includes safeguarding critical geographies such as the Panama Canal and Caribbean assets, while fostering partnerships to combat migration and narcotics. Military posture will readjust accordingly, shifting resources from distant commitments to hemispheric priorities. This regional focus is portrayed as a commonsense restoration of power, aligning with economic nationalism and border security imperatives.
In Europe, the strategy delivers blunt criticism, accusing the continent of civilizational decay through policies on migration, free speech suppression, and loss of self-confidence. It urges Europeans to reclaim their vitality, framing this as complementary to America’s own domestic renaissance. Transatlantic ties are reframed transactionally, with less emphasis on unconditional support for institutions like NATO. The document signals a desire to negotiate an end to the Ukraine conflict as a core interest, aiming to reestablish strategic stability with Russia and prevent further alliance expansion. This marks a departure from confrontation, prioritizing de-escalation over indefinite containment.
Toward China, the approach is pragmatic rather than ideological. While recognizing strategic competition, particularly in economic domains and the Indo-Pacific, the NSS avoids escalation. It frames rivalry in terms of business opportunities, trade routes, and maintaining preeminence, allowing for managed interdependence. Recent decisions, such as permitting exports of advanced Nvidia H200 AI chips to vetted Chinese customers in exchange for revenue shares, underscore this conflict-avoidance posture. Reassurances during tensions with allies like Japan further illustrate a preference for stability over provocation. The strategy maintains commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific through alliances, but within a hierarchy where hemispheric concerns dominate.
This evolving US posture carries significant implications for India, a nation whose strategic partnerships with Washington deepened during the unipolar era. The NSS mentions India positively but sparingly, positioning it as a partner in Indo-Pacific stability and a counterweight in broader coalitions against Chinese influence. References highlight cooperation on critical minerals and joint efforts with Quad members to preserve regional security. Yet, India’s role appears instrumental rather than central, a means to sustain US interests in the Western Pacific amid burden-shifting to frontline states. The document’s silence on deeper bilateral commitments reflects a downgrading from earlier strategies that hailed India as a leading global power.
Delhi should approach these signals cautiously. The US-India relationship flourished under assumptions of American primacy and shared ideological threats, particularly containing China. That era has waned, and the NSS’s transactional realism suggests Washington views partners through a narrower lens of utility. India’s value lies in its geographic position and growing capabilities, but not as an indispensable ally warranting unqualified support. Notably, the strategy omits discussion of subcontinental dynamics, including Pakistan’s deepening integration into Middle Eastern security frameworks. In 2025, Islamabad forged a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, enhancing its role in Gulf stability and aligning with US efforts to bolster regional partners against Iranian threats. This development, coupled with historical US reliance on Pakistan in Middle Eastern contingencies, revives old frictions. Washington’s endorsement of Pakistan’s expanded security contributions underscores that the subcontinent remains an area of uncertainty in bilateral ties, potentially complicating India’s regional ambitions.
For India, the NSS underscores the imperative of strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Clinging to outdated paradigms of US-led order risks misalignment with emerging realities. Opportunities exist in diversified supply chains, where US efforts to reduce dependence on China could benefit Indian manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors and clean energy. Collaboration on public goods, such as digital infrastructure and health initiatives, offers avenues for influence without over-reliance. Yet, challenges abound: a more inward-focused America may free China to assert dominance in Asia, intensifying pressures along the Himalayas and in neighboring states. India’s multi-alignment approach, balancing relations with the US, Russia, and others, gains renewed relevance.
The Trump administration’s strategy refutes the ideological foundations of perpetual primacy, embracing a world where great powers coexist with defined spheres. It accepts multipolarity’s inevitability, even as internal tensions between isolationist impulses and deep-state commitments persist. For India, this transition demands vigilance and adaptability. The US remains a vital partner, but no longer the guarantor of a favorable order. Delhi must navigate this landscape by strengthening indigenous capabilities, deepening ties with like-minded powers, and pursuing interests unencumbered by great-power rivalries. In an era where America steps back from global Atlas-like burdens, India’s rise will depend on its own strategic foresight and resilience.
